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Abstract
Empirical investigation of business failures has considered the eects of macroeconomic
conditions and nancial healthiness in isolation. Using a panel of ve Asian economies
- Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand - over the period 1995{2007
we analyse the link between rm survival and nancial healthiness during the 1997-
98 Asian crisis. We show that the sensitivity of survival to nancial indicators is
signicantly higher during the crisis compared to tranquil periods. In addition, we nd
that the eect of nancial indicators is quantitatively and qualitatively more important
in economies with less developed stock exchanges.
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1 Introduction
A large and growing set of empirical studies has highlighted the role of nancial healthiness
in inuencing corporate failures. A stylised fact established by this literature is that balance
sheet position matters for rm survival. For instance, it is found that rms with low prof-
itability and high capital gearing are more likely to fail (see Zingales (1998); Fotopoulos and
Louri (2000); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Bellone et al.
(2008)). In recent years the research agenda has attempted to investigate the importance
of macroeconomic environment in rm survival. Alvarez and Gorg (2009) show that exit
rates for foreign plants increase during severe slowdowns by highlighting the 1999 Chilean
recession. Bhattcharjee et al. (2009) nd that UK rms are more likely to go bankrupt dur-
ing periods which are marked by high ination and exchange rate instability. These studies,
however, focus on the direct eect of macroeconomic conditions on business exits without
allowing for the fact that rms with varying levels of nancial healthiness might respond
to economic downturns disproportionately. The purpose of this paper is to ll this gap by
investigating whether the 1997-98 Asian crisis had an indirect eect on corporate failures
through balance sheet indicators.
Understanding the link between rm survival and balance sheet healthiness during the
1997-98 Asian crisis is an important consideration since imperfect capital markets generate
a transmission mechanism through which an economic shock can create large and persistent
domestic balance sheet eects.1 There is evidence that real rm decisions such as xed in-
vestment and inventory activity respond to rms' nancial healthiness signicantly dierent
for recessions and non-recessions (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). Intuitively, we do not ex-
pect all rms to be aected by changes in macroeconomic conditions in the same way. Firms
which display healthier balance sheets are more likely to be able to endure extreme economic
conditions compared to rms which are characterised by poorer balance sheet positions. To
1According to the nancial accelerator theory (Bernanke et al. (1999)), procyclical movements in the
rm's net worth and credit constraints can amplify and propagate the real or monetary policy shock.
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this end, we analyse for the rst time the eects of nancial indicators on rms' survival
prospects, dierentiating between crisis and out of crisis periods. In addition, in our paper
we recognise that the link between rms' survival chances and nancial healthiness may
dier across economies with dierent levels of nancial development. Therefore, we allow
for the fact that rms operating in economies with less developed stock exchanges might
respond to the Asian crisis dierently.
The East Asian currency and banking crisis is an ideal setting to study the link between
rm survival and nancial healthiness because during this period most corporations were
exposed to loans denominated in foreign currency. After the depreciation of the exchange
rate highly leveraged rms experienced severe balance sheet damage and in some cases they
were forced into bankruptcy.2 The conditions rms faced in Asia were due in large part to
asymmetric information and nancial accelerator mechanisms thrown into reverse. Thus,
rms with worse balance sheets were more likely to face higher external nance premia and
were more vulnerable to adverse economic shocks. In turn, this might have hindered their
performance and survival prospects.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we examine the response of the
crisis on rm failure with respect to nancial variables. This exercise will provide us with
the indirect eect of the crisis on survival through interactions with rm-specic nancial
variables. While previous studies have included nancial variables in equations modelling
rm survival (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008)
and Huynh et al. (2010, 2012a)) our intention is to test the importance of rms' nancial
status on their survival prospects distinguishing between crisis and tranquil periods.
Second, we examine whether the link between rm survival and nancial healthiness
during the 1997-98 Asian crisis diers across economies with more and less developed nancial
systems. Firms operating in less market-oriented economies with limited access to capital
markets and stronger reliance on nancial intermediaries are more likely to suer a shortage
2At that time the banking system was poorly regulated or supervised and drew back loans as their own
liquidity dried up.
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of credit during the crisis compared to more market-based economies. Therefore, we examine
whether the link between rm survival and nancial health during the crisis diers between
more and less developed nancial markets.
Finally, we provide evidence on corporate failures with a focus on the Asian economies
rather than Europe or the US. This is important if we consider that Asian capital markets are
largely underdeveloped compared to Western economies and therefore bank runs during the
1997-98 crisis might have accelerated the negative eects on rms' performance. Further, we
use a novel database that combines several sources including Thomson Financial Primark,
Zephyr and the Asian Development Bank, covering the period 1995 to 2007 for Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and
empirical literature on rm survival. Section 3 illustrates the econometric modelling strategy.
In Section 4 we describe our data and provide summary statistics. Section 5 presents the
empirical evidence. In section 6 we check the robustness of our ndings. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Economic background
In this section we review theoretical and empirical studies that are mostly related to our
work. We start with a discussion of rm survival and rm-specic characteristics before we
consider the analysis of macroeconomic conditions and extreme economic events.
2.1 Theoretical background on rm survival
A number of theoretical papers have emphasised learning by rms as a determinant of exit
(Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998)). In these models, rms are all single estab-
lishments, and their exit hazard rate fall as they age, i.e they use their experience of market
signals to learn about their own productivity. The main idea is that the risk of closure is
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highest after rms' birth and decreases over time. This thesis might be explained by noisy
selection models underlined by Mata and Portugal (1994) for the Portuguese manufacturing
sector. Apart from the noisy selection models, there are further theoretical predictions on
hazard rates. In Hopehayn (1992), rm productivity is driven by a persistent stochastic
process. Younger rms are smaller because their initial productivity is lower than the in-
cumbent's mean. Moreover, their growth is faster and more volatile, because of decreasing
returns to scale. Both Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) develop theoretical
models in which rms are uncertain not only about the rm-specic shocks that they will
face, but also about their own ability. In these models, hazard rates also depend on age
and rm size. Hazard rates decline with size since a large rm rationally believes it is a
good quality rm and so is less likely to exit. In addition, small rms typically face higher
restrictions on capital markets leading to a higher risk of insolvency and liquidity. To sum
up, Hopehayn (1992) presents a formal model where in each period rms are subject to
individual productivity shocks after which they decide whether to exit or not. Under certain
assumptions, hazard rates are lower for old and large rms.
Recent work by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) complements previous theoretical pre-
dictions. The framework introduced by Jovanovic (1982), Hopehayn (1992) and Pakes and
Ericson (1998) does not rely on moral hazard. The main advantage of Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2006) is that their theoretical model, dierently from the pre-existing literature, gen-
erates a nontrivial role for capital structure creating a repeated moral hazard model. In
other words, the authors argue that the Modigliani-Miller proposition does not hold and
therefore nancing considerations signicantly complicate the investment relationship, in-
troducing important determinants beyond neoclassical fundamentals. Specically, Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006) introduce the idea of borrowing constraints since there is asymmetric
information between the lender and the rm. At the beginning of each period, the rm
faces a cash-in-advance constraint: it requires the bank to nance the xed cost that it has
to pay in order to stay in the market. The bank makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the
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rm and issues funds at an interest rate r that is dierent across rms. Therefore, in their
theoretical model rm heterogeneity is prevalent and the presence of borrowing constraints
has important implications on rms' chances of survival.
2.2 Empirical background on rm survival
The empirical literature on the determinants of rm survival is in agreement with the theoret-
ical models discussed above. In particular, it has highlighted that considerable heterogeneity
exists across rms. Part of this heterogeneity has been explained by rm-specic charac-
teristics such as size, age and the type of plant, and part by industry eects, such as the
importance of capital intensity and technology. With respect to the rm-specic determi-
nants, there is a consensus that the likelihood of survival is positively associated with the
size of the rm. This nding seems to be quite robust across a number of countries (see Mata
and Portugal (1994)). In addition to rm size, the literature has found that age matters for
rm survival, with the youngest companies experiencing the highest levels of risk (see Mata
and Portugal (1994)). Besides size and age, another strand of literature has considered the
type of the establishment as determinant of rm survival. In particular, Bandick and Gorg
(2010) examine the eect of foreign acquisition on survival probability of target Swedish
plants, while Gorg and Strobl (2003) and Alvarez and Gorg (2009) investigate whether al-
iates of foreign multinationals are more or less likely to exit than domestic rms in Ireland
and Chile respectively. Their ndings show that the survival for acquired Swedish exporters
improves post acquisition, whereas foreign plants in Chile and Ireland are more likely to exit
the economy than domestic plants. Finally, there is a literature related to characteristics
specic to the industry, such as industry concentration and capital intensity. These char-
acteristics were found by Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) to play a negative role on rm
survival, while Gorg and Strobl (2003) show that technology aects positively the survival
of indigenous rms.
A large and growing set of empirical studies has highlighted the role of nancial health-
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iness in inuencing corporate failures. A stylised fact established by this literature is that
balance sheet position matters for rm survival. For instance, it is found that rms with low
protability, high debt levels and high capital gearing are more likely to fail (see Zingales
(1998); Fotopoulos and Louri (2000); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia
(2008); Bellone et al. (2008) and Huynh et al. (2010)). Specically, Zingales (1998) uses
data on the US tracking industry to examine how debt aects market share and sales. He
considers a survival model where debt can aect a rm's ability to compete and eventually
survive in the industry and concludes that high debt adversely aects survival. Using data
for Greece, Fotopoulos and Louri (2000) have shown that, controlling for other rm- and
industry- specic characteristics, rms' debt to assets ratios have a signicantly negative
eect on their survival probabilities, while their ratios of tangible assets to total assets have
a positive eect. Similar results were obtained by Bunn and Redwood (2003). In a study of
U.K rms, they nd that a range of nancial variables including the debt to assets ratio play
a signicant eect on rms' survival probabilities. In the same spirit, Bridges and Guariglia
(2008), using UK data, investigate the eects of nancial characteristics on survival prob-
abilities. The authors nd that lower collateral and higher leverage result in higher failure
probabilities for purely domestic than for globally engaged rms. Using French data, Bellone
et al. (2008) show that rms with negative prots are twice as likely to exit the industry than
rms with positive prots. More recently, Huynh et al. (2010, 2012b) show that leverage has
a nonlinear eect on rm survival. At low levels of leverage the eect is negative but at the
high quantiles it becomes positive.
In recent years the research agenda has attempted to investigate the importance of
macroeconomic environment on rm survival. This is based on the idea that rms respond
to market pressures taking into account the relative costs and benets associated with the
dierent options available to them. The literature by Alvarez and Gorg (2009, 2011) and
Bhattcharjee et al. (2009) refers to this issue. More specically, Alvarez and Gorg (2009)
show that exit rates for foreign plants increase during severe slowdowns by highlighting
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the 1999 Chilean recession. Alvarez and Gorg (2011) use the same empirical setting of the
Chilean economic slowdown to show that multinationals are more likely to exit contributing
to the employment contraction during the crisis. Bhattcharjee et al. (2009) nd that UK
rms are more likely to go bankrupt during periods which are marked by high ination and
exchange rate instability. They conclude that macroeconomic instability raises the proba-
bility of bankruptcy. These studies, however, focus on the direct eect of macroeconomic
conditions on business exits without allowing for the fact that rms with varying levels of
protability, debt and collateral might respond to economic downturns disproportionately.
This is motivated by the fact that rms which display healthier balance sheets are more likely
to be able to endure extreme economic conditions compared to rms which are characterised
by poorer balance sheet positions.
The link between rm survival and balance sheet healthiness during the crisis may dier
for countries with more and less developed stock exchanges. This argument is based on
the consideration that macroeconomic shocks are magnied by the existence of signicant
nancial intermediation in economies where rms have limited access to external nance
(Beck et al. (2006)). Asian markets are inherent to bank runs and therefore higher levels
of banking development could impede rms' performance and survival prospects.3 Firms
operating in economies with less developed nancial markets may limit themselves to bank
nance, due to the absence of a developed capital market, and therefore they might face
an increased hazard of failure during the Asian crisis (see Tsoukas (2011)). In our context
economies with higher levels of equity market development are more likely to provide rms
with better access to external nance through capital markets, while those with lower levels
of equity market development are more likely to limit rms' access to external funding.
Therefore, we argue that rm survival and nancial health in market-based countries is
dierent compared with bank-based economies.
3Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that Asia's dependence on banks was important for the 1997-98 crisis.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Empirical specications
The theoretical rationale for expecting an eect from rms' nancial position on their survival
prospects is well documented in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). In their model borrowing
constraints aect rm survival and this generates a role for capital structure in an asymmetric
information setup. In our empirical analysis we take on board these predictions and we also
consider whether the impact of nancial indicators on corporate failures diers between crisis
and tranquil periods. We dene a rm as failed in a given year when its company status is
that of dead.4 Following the empirical literature on rm survival (see for example Mata and
Portugal (1994); Gorg and Strobl (2003); Yang and Temple (2012) and Huynh et al. (2010,
2012a)) we use a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox (1972)) with time-varying covariates.
The proportional hazard of a rm failing in time t is formulated as:
h(t; x) = h0(t)e
X (3.1)
where h(t) is the rate at which rms fail at time t given that they have survived in t  1,
for a given number of covariates as dened below. h0(t) is the baseline hazard function at
time t when all of the covariates are set to zero. The semi-parametric nature of the Cox
model allows us to estimate the relationship between the hazard rate and covariates without
requiring any restrictive assumptions regarding the baseline hazard. Every parameter
estimate to be reported in this paper is the hazard ratio, which is the ratio
of the hazard rate when the variable increases by one unit. In other words, a
hazard ratio over one implies than an increase in the given explanatory variable
increases the hazard or probability of exit. On the other hand, a hazard ratio
below one means that an increase in the variable reduces the hazard (or increases
4Details on the construction of our dependent variable are provided in the next section. Also note that
we use the terms failure and survival interchangeably.
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the probability of survival).
Our main goal is to examine whether the impact of nancial indicators on corporate fail-
ures was dierent during the Asian crisis than in other periods. Taking the above argument
into consideration, we specify a dummy representing the Asian crisis (Crisis) that takes the
value 1 in years 1997-98, and 0 otherwise. We interact our nancial indicators in vector X
(dened below) with the Crisis and (1  Crisis) terms to capture the sensitivity of failure
to nancial indicators in and out of the crisis. Thus the following model is specied:
h(t) = h0(t)e
(1XCrisis+2X(1 Crisis)+3Y+4Z) (3.2)
The model evaluates whether the Asian crisis alters rms' propensity to fail through nan-
cial indicators. In other words, we check whether the impact of the nancial crisis on failure
can be amplied by rms with weak balance sheets. In addition, our model includes country
dummies to control for institutional dierences between countries and industry dummies to
control for xed eects across industries.
3.2 Financial variables
Vector X considers three dimensions of nancial health, namely leverage, protability and
collateral assets. This is motivated by the theoretical model of Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006)5 and previous empirical studies ( Bunn and Redwood (2003) and Bridges and Guar-
iglia (2008)). To begin with nancial leverage (Leverage), which is measured as the ratio
of total debt over total assets, we note that high levels of existing debt are associated with
a worse balance sheet situation, which would increase moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, and lead to the inability of rms to obtain external nance at a reasonable cost
(see Levin et al. (2004) and Bougheas et al. (2006)). Zingales (1998) and Bridges and Guar-
iglia (2008) argue that higher leverage results in higher failure probabilities. Accordingly,
5Their model generates a role for capital structure in an asymmetric information setup. The theoretical
frameworks on survival were rstly introduced by Hopehayn (1992) and Jovanovic (1982) without considering
a role for moral hazard.
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we expect a positive relationship between leverage and the probability of survival.
Protability (Profitability) is dened as the ratio of the rm's prots before interests
and tax to its total assets. We use this indicator to measure a rm's ability to generate
prots. It is widely accepted that internal funds can serve as a buer to absorb unexpected
losses, reducing the probability of insolvency and, therefore, the expected bankruptcy cost
(see Bunn and Redwood (2003) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)). We therefore expect to
nd protability to decrease the probability of failure.
Collateral (Collateral) is dened as tangible assets over total assets and proxies for the
rm's ability to pledge collateral for external nance. In the survival literature, access to
collateral assets is very important since Farinha and Santos (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia
(2008) document that rms with a larger fraction of tangibles in their balance sheets are
more likely to survive. Thus, we expect rms with a high collateral ratio to experience lower
probabilities of failure.
3.3 Control variables
The covariates used in the vector Y are all chosen in view of other work on rm survival and
what is available in the data. We add the rm size (Size) measured as the logarithm of real
total assets and its squared term to control for nonlinearities. According to Geroski (1995),
a rm's size plays an important role in determining rm failures. The argument is that
large rms experience higher survival probabilities than their smaller counterparts because
they have access to alternative sources of external nance and they are less informationally
opaque. Thus large rms are less at risk of failure than small rms (Dunne et al. (1998) and
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)). In our analysis we expect to nd a positive relationship
between rm size and the probability of survival. We also include the age of the rm (Age)
which measures the number of years a rm has been listed on the stock exchange. Firms
with an established track record are less likely to fail than those that are younger because
they are usually more able to withstand past economic and nancial downturns and therefore
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face a smaller liquidation risk. This would be the case both for domestic and multinational
rms as noted by Gorg and Strobl (2002). Consequently, we anticipate a negative association
between age and the incidence of failure.
In vector Y we also control for the macroeconomic conditions by adding the real ex-
change rate, which measures the exchange rate environment. Baggs et al. (2009) document
a negative association between survival and appreciation of the Canadian dollar. We expect
the exchange rate (Exchange) to be positively associated with the rm's probability to fail.6
In addition, we account for industry eects by adding the minimum ecient scale of the
industry (MES), measured as the log of median output in each sector of the economy. One
might expect rms entering industries with large minimum ecient scale to have lower prob-
abilities of survival than rms entering other industries, Mata and Portugal (1994).7 Lastly,
vector Z is a set of country and industry dummies that control for institutional dierences
between countries and for xed eects across industries.
4 Data and summary statistics
4.1 Data description
We use data from prot and loss and balance sheet accounts recorded in Thomson Financial
Primark which cover rms in emerging Asia mostly aected by the 1997-98 crisis -Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The choice of Asian markets in our analysis is
justied by three important considerations. First, emerging East Asian economies are char-
acterised by a highly volatile environment and high risk of bankruptcy providing therefore
a fertile ground for the analysis of corporate failures.8 Second, our data cover the period
6We attempted to include both the real exchange rate and its volatility in the regression models but they
never attracted signicant coecients. The results on the nancial variables, however, remain unchanged and
therefore we report only the models with the real exchange variable controlling for macroeconomic eects.
7All variables in the models with the exception of MES are time-varying.
8Compared to Western economies, emerging Asian countries experience signicantly higher corporate
failure rates: the average failure rate for the ve economies included in the present study is 9%, compared
to only 1.5% in the UK (Bridges and Guariglia (2008)).
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1995{2007 and therefore the Asian crisis presents a natural experiment to test the indirect
eects of extreme economic conditions on corporate failures. Third, our sample takes into
account the fact that there is a wide regional variation in Asian markets in terms of size,
liquidity and sophistication. Therefore, we expect to observe signicant heterogeneity with
respect to nancial architecture.
Our database reports rms as `dead' but it may be possible that some rms could be
recorded as `dead' not because they failed but because they merged with another rm in-
stead.9 Thus we also rely on the Zephyr database, which is distributed by Bureau Van Dijk,
to obtain data on mergers and acquisitions to clean our sample from rms falsely recorded as
`dead' from Thomson Financial Primark. Finally, data on the real eective exchange rates
are taken from the Bank for International Settlements.
To clean our data we apply normal selection criteria used in the literature and we exclude
rms that did not have complete records for all explanatory variables and rm-years with
negative sales and prots. We also exclude observations in the 0.5 percent from the upper
and the lower tails of the distribution of the regressors to control for the potential inuence
of outliers. Our sample contains data for 358 rms in Indonesia, 917 in Korea, 871 in
Malaysia, 596 in Singapore and 530 in Thailand, a total of 3,272 rms. A large fraction of
these rms (88.4%) are listed on the stock exchange and only a small fraction are unlisted
(11.6%). It should be noted that our estimations include only publicly traded rms since
the Age variable measures the number of years a rm has been listed on the stock exchange.
Therefore, our nal panel includes 2,892 listed rms for ve Asian economies, which are
operating in all sectors of the economy for the years 1995-2007. To make sure that our
sample is representative of the aggregate economies, in terms of the population of listed
rms, we present some graphical analysis. Figure 1 shows the number of listed rms in our
data and those reported in the World Bank database (WDI). Comparing the two lines, we
observe that they paint a similar picture of the state of listed rms in Asia over time. Finally,
9Thomson Financial Primark data do not provide details on the status of rms i.e. whether the company
status is that of receivership, liquidation, in default or dissolved.
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we note that the two series are highly correlated and exhibit similar variation across time.
They both present an upward trend which is consistent with the view that stock markets
have become increasingly important in Asia over the last decade.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
To begin with the descriptive analysis, gure 2 shows the distribution of corporate failures
over time. We observe that most failures occur in 1997 which coincides with the onset of
the Asian crisis and in 1998 which marks the end of the crisis. Apart from this period the
distribution of failures over time is reasonably stable. Table 1 reports summary statistics
for the variables used in our empirical analysis. Means and standard deviations of the rm-
specic variables and nancial indicators are presented for the total sample (column 1), for
failed and surviving rms (columns 2 and 3) and for rms during and outside the crisis
(columns 5 and 6). Further, the p-values of a test for the equality of means are presented
in columns 4 and 7. Looking at columns 2 and 3 we observe that surviving rms are less
indebted, more protable and more collateralised compared to failing rms. These statistics
conrm previous empirical results (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Farinha
and Santos (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)) that rms which display healthier
balance sheets are less likely to fail. In addition, we nd that survivors are larger and longer
listed on the stock exchange which is in line with previous empirical and theoretical research,
which shows that the probability of exit decreases with rm size and age (e.g Jovanovic
(1982) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)). These dierences between sub-samples are
statistically signicant in all cases.
When comparing crisis and out of crisis periods (columns 5 and 6), we note that the
average failure rate is almost two times larger during the 1997-98 crisis. This statistic
conrms the association between corporate failures and adverse economic events as shown
in Figure 2. In addition, during the crisis rms display worse balance sheets than in other
periods which suggests that during downturns, economic activity faces a general slowdown
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which is likely to aect bank credit, business protability and survival among other rms' real
decisions. P-values suggest that dierences between sub-samples are statistically signicant
in all but one cases.
Taken together these summary statistics suggest that there is a signicant correlation
between rms' failure rates, their nancial health and the state of the economy. It remains
to be seen, though, whether these preliminary ndings continue to hold when we control for
a number of factors which are known to play a role in determining rms' survival chances.
In the sections that follow we test within a formal regression analysis framework whether
the sensitivity of survival to nancial indicators is signicantly higher during the Asian crisis
compared to tranquil periods.
5 Results
5.1 Financial health and the Asian crisis
To assess the role of the East Asian nancial crisis in rms' hazard of failure, we focus on the
indirect impact of the crisis on the probability of survival. We specify a time-period dummy
variable to indicate that rms faced the Asian crisis. The crisis dummy is constructed to
take the value 1 in years 1997-1998 and the value 0 otherwise. Our empirical model contains
interactions of the nancial indicators (Leverage, Protability and Collateral) with the crisis
dummy to examine whether there was an asymmetric response of nancial variables to
business failure during the crisis.
Results are reported in Table 2, where the nancial indicators interacted with Crisis
and (1  Crisis) terms are used one by one in successive columns. At the foot of the Table
we present tests of equality which suggest signicant dierences between the interacted
terms. In column 1 we observe that Leverage during the crisis is statistically signicant
at the 1% level. Higher levels of debt are often associated with an unhealthy balance sheet
indicating that highly leveraged rms face greater diculties obtaining funds on the markets,
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especially during extreme economic conditions. Our ndings are not only statistically but
also economically important since the hazard ratio associated with leverage during the crisis
equals 1.329. This means that, highly indebted rms are more likely to fail during the crisis
compared to less indebted rms, with the exit risk for the former being about 1.3 times
higher than that of the latter.
In column 2 we observe the important role of Profitability in rm survival (see Bunn
and Redwood (2003)) since the hazard ratios are below one. In other words, an increase in
protability increases the probability of survival. Once again, the eects are signicantly
larger for the crisis period. Thus, rms which are able to generate prots can use their
internal funds as a buer to absorb unexpected losses, reducing the probability of insolvency
and the hazard of failure. In terms of economic magnitude, the survival probability of a
protable rm during the crisis is as much as 1.2% higher compared to a less protable rm.
In column 3 we show that the estimates of Collateral are statistically signicant at the 1%
level both in and out of the crisis. This nding indicates that being able to pledge collateral
for external nance is associated with higher chances of survival (Bridges and Guariglia
(2008)). This eect is more potent during the crisis suggesting that high collateralised
rms are able to raise external nance even when banks decide to interrupt lines of credit.
Therefore, rms with high levels of tangibility can mitigate the risk of failure. To gauge the
economic eect we rely on the hazard ratios.
a 1% increase in collateral would reduce the hazard of failure by 60% during the Asian
crisis and by 48% outside the Asian crisis.
Finally, in column 4 we consider all nancial indicators. Once again, we nd a signicant
and economically important association between nancial healthiness and the probability of
failure during the Asian crisis. With respect to our control variables, we nd that Size has a
non-linear eect on rm survival, while MES is quantitatively unimportant. The estimates
of Age are statistically signicant at the 1% level and the hazard ratios are below one,
indicating that older rms are less likely to fail. Finally, the proxy for the macroeconomic
15
condition has a positive eect on failure which supports the theory that a stronger local
currency raises the probability of rms to fail (Baggs et al. (2009)).10
To summarise, we nd that survival prospects are more sensitive to nancial indicators
during the Asian crisis uncovering an important link between nancial health and rm sur-
vival which is stronger during economic downturns. This gives support to the idea that good
nancial shape is an important determinant of survival during economic shocks since rms
might face diculties in accessing external nance.
5.1.1 Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity
One potential concern with the Cox model employed in this paper is that it does not take
into account unobserved heterogeneity. This particular heterogeneity may be thought of, in
general terms, as rm-specic dierences in some unobservable attribute (e.g. management
ability), that might aect rm survival and might consequently cause an omitted variable
bias in the Cox regression. To address this issue, we estimate shared-frailty models:
h(t; x) = h0(t)e
X (5.1)
where the parameter  accounts for any unobserved heterogeneity. The usual gamma
distribution is chosen to account for this unobserved heterogeneity/shared-frailty. Following
Huynh et al. (2010, 2012a), the unobserved heterogeneity is captured in terms of indus-
trial and regional groupings. Specically, our data cover the following nine industries: 1)
Agriculture, shing, quarrying; 2) Manufacturing; 3) Electricity, gas and water supply; 4)
Construction; 5) Wholesales and retail trade, hotels, restaurants; 6) Transport, post and
telecommunications; 7) Finance and business activities; 8) Public and personal services; 9)
Activity not stated. In addition, our data span the following Asian economies: Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
10As a robustness, we have also estimated our regressions parametrically, using Weibull distribution. We
nd, but do no report for brevity, that this modication does not alter our results.
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The results for the shared-frailty models are reported in Table 3. We nd that our
main results are upheld. In particular, with the exception of leverage the interaction terms
between nancial variables and the crisis period are signicantly dierent. We show that
the impact of protability and collateral is more potent during the Asian crisis compared to
other periods. In other words, our main results are not a by-product of not accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity.
To assess the model specication, we present and discuss the baseline hazards obtained
from the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity. As a rule, the baseline hazard
is an important diagnostic in the Cox proportional hazard models. The main idea is that
the baseline hazard should capture any aggregate time variation related to rm survival.11
Figure 3 displays the estimated baseline hazards obtained from the model without shared-
frailty (NH) and the model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (H). Both models
follow a very similar pattern generating negative duration dependence i.e the longer a rm
is operating the more likely it is to survive. This negative duration dependence is consistent
with the implications of theoretical models such as Jovanovic (1982) stating hazard rates
decline with age. All in all, we conclude that our main ndings are not driven by unobserved
heterogeneity not accounted for in the Cox models.
5.2 The dierentiated eect of nancial systems
Thus far we have shown the average eect of nancial variables on rm survival over all
countries, without making distinctions about the level of nancial development. In this
subsection, the possible dierentiated eect of nancial systems is investigated by conducting
a country-by-county analysis. To formally motivate our pooled versus country-by-country
analysis, we formulate a likelihood ratio test based on the baseline hazard. In particular, we
estimate the Cox model as shown in Equation 3.2 with a common baseline hazard (Model A).
Then, we estimate a Cox model with a strata of baseline, allowing each country to have their
11In the Cox model, the baseline hazard is estimated non-parametrically so it should be robust to mis-
specication, especially in the presence of shared frailty (see Huynh et al. (2012b)).
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own baseline hazard (Model B). Finally, we retrieve the log likelihood from each model and
form a likelihood ratio test. Table 4 reports the outcome of the above test for both models.
The likelihood ratio statistic indicates that the country-by-country model ts signicantly
better than the pooled model.
FOOTNOTE?It is important to check this poolability because the results of the F-tests
of equality for Leverage, Protability and Collateral could be driven by country specic-
trends. For example, there could be a latent factor that aects both stock market devel-
opment and rm survival i.e. political institutions. For example, Hallward-Driemeier and
Rijkers (2010) report that Indonesia rms that were connected to the Suharto regime suered
disproportionately (higher failure rate) during Asian nancial crisis.
In addition to the likelihood ratio test, there are reasons to believe that the ve economies
included in this study have experienced dierent levels of nancial development.12 In the
aftermath of the Asian crisis, Asian governments have issued increasing numbers of sovereign
or quasi-sovereign bonds and there is evidence that Asian nancial systems are less bank-
centered than before (see Tsoukas (2011)). While most emerging Asian economies are
thought to be mainly bank-based, we can still observe signicant heterogeneity with respect
to nancial market development. According to our data, throughout our sample period the
average ratio of total stock market value traded to GDP, which is a measure of stock market
liquidity, is 1.36 for Korea followed by 0.98 for Singapore. The corresponding gures for
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are 0.10, 0.66 and 0.37, respectively.13 In this subsection
we compare the ve countries during the Asian crisis to acquire more evidence regarding the
dierentiated eects of nancial systems. Accordingly, we estimate our models from Table
2 on a country-by-country basis. The results are reported in Table 4 and we are able to
identify signicant dierences across countries in the hazard ratios of the nancial variables.
12For instance, Kim and Shamsuddin (2008) using the level of equity market development categorised Korea
and Singapore into the `advanced' or `developed' group of emerging economies and Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand into the `secondary' emerging markets group.
13Heterogeneity in nancial development is also apparent if we consider alternative indicators of nancial
development such as the ratio of private bank credit to GDP, the ratio of deposit-money bank assets to GDP
and stock market capitalization.
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To begin with Leverage, we nd signicant positive eects for both crisis and tranquil
periods for Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia. Based on the tests of equality reported at the
bottom of the Table, the point estimates on the interacted terms are signicantly dierent
from each other only for Indonesia and Malaysia, while we nd no signicant dierences for
the Korean sample. In addition, we nd no signicant eects for Singapore both in and out
of the economic crisis. With respect to Thailand, we nd that the coecient on leverage is
positive and signicant during the crisis, while insignicant when interacted with the out-of-
crisis time period. Based on our results, leverage appears to be more important during the
crisis for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. As discussed above, these countries rely heavily
on banks and their stock market is less developed compared with Korea and Singapore. Thus
our results imply that higher levels of existing debt could adversely aect rms' survival
chances in economies which are characterised by high levels of nancial intermediation. This
is consistent with the view that during economic downturns banks might limit the provision
of credit to highly indebted bank-dependent companies. Firms that have suered a severe
shortage of credit are more likely to face a higher probability of failure unless credit becomes
cheaper and more readily available.
Moving to Profitability, we nd that higher levels of prots would reduce rm failures
during the economic crisis. This is the case for all countries apart from Korea and Singapore.
Comparing the coecients in rows 3 and 4 we nd that the interactive terms for Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand are signicantly higher during the crisis. This is evident from the tests
of equality reported in Table 3. Thus, we conclude that prots are more important in shaping
business failures across bank-based countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. This
result suggests that the viability of rms, operating in bank-oriented economies, during the
crisis is determined by the stronger reliance on prots since access to banks is sometimes
prohibitively expensive.
Collateral attracts negative and signicant coecients during the crisis period for In-
donesia, Malaysia and Thailand. At the other extreme, the coecients on collateral when
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they are interacted with the out-of-crisis dummy are insignicant for all economies, apart
from Korea and Singapore. The coecients, however, are signicantly dierent from each
other for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, as shown from the tests of equality reported at
the foot of the Table. As we would expect higher levels of tangible assets would increase
rms' survival prospects in economies with less developed stock exchanges because rms
will not have access to alternative sources of funding and thus pledging tangible assets as
collateral is a comparative advantage for receiving bank debt. On the contrary, we do not
identify signicant dierences when we look at economies with developed nancial markets
(i.e Korea and Singapore). This result implies that having more tangible assets is not neces-
sarily an advantage in economies where rms are able to access alternative sources of nance
and therefore can obtain external funding at a reasonable cost. We can conclude that rms
in bank-centered economies might have to signal to banks their ability to post collateral in
order to obtain external funding since tangibility increases the value that can be recaptured
by creditors if rms default. Finally, the signs and signicance of the control variables do
not change once we compare the ve countries.
In summary, we show that the response of the nancial variables to survival during the
crisis diers across the ve economies included in this study. Specically, we show that
nancial variables exert a signicant eect on the likelihood of survival during the crisis for
rms operating in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand which are bank-based countries. On
the contrary, the eect of nancial variables on survival is not important for Korea and
Singapore, which are characterised by developed stock exchanges. Therefore, our results
strongly support the second hypothesis which postulates that nancial variables are more
important in inuencing rm survival in economies with less developed stock exchanges.
This is consistent with the notion that when nancial intermediaries decrease the supply
of loans to corporations, rms have to display good nancial health to avoid exit from the
market.
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6 Additional robustness tests
6.1 Addressing concerns about endogeneity in our regressors
Our empirical models include a set of rm-specic nancial variables that may be endoge-
nous. Therefore, one potential concern is that our results may be driven by endogeneity in
our regressors. We address this issue by allowing the rm-specic variables to be endogenous
and then instrumenting for them through a two-stage procedure. Leverage, protability, col-
lateral, size and size squared are instrumented using their lagged levels in t-1 ;t-2. Our
approach to employ instrumental variable techniques in the estimations is formally justied
by using a Wald test of exogeneity. In all cases the Wald test emphatically rejects the null
of exogeneity in our regressors vindicating our endogenous approach. We further test for the
validity and the relevance of the instruments using the Sargan test of overidentifying restric-
tions and the Anderson test. Both tests are obtained from a linear instrumental variables
model using the same set of instruments as in the two-step IV model. We report p-values of
the tests at the foot of the tables of results.
Tables XXX and XXX show our estimations corrected for endogeneity and these should be
compared with Tables 2 and 3, respectively. To begin with the baseline model in Table 4, we
show that during the 1997-98 crisis rms' survival prospects were more sensitive to changes in
leverage, protability and collateral. Thus we nd results that conrm our ndings presented
in Table 2. In particular, the role of rms' nancial status is signicantly associated with
their likelihood of survival during the Asian crisis. Further, the results for partitioning our
sample into ve countries, as shown in Table 5, conrm the importance of good nancial
health on the hazard of failure for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, which are bank-based
economies, during economic unrest. In line with our previous results in Table 3, we nd that
rms operating in bank-dependent economies are more likely to survive the crisis if they
exhibit healthy balance sheets. On the contrary, we do not nd a signicant link between
rms' nancial healthiness and survival for economies with developed equity markets such
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as Korea and Singapore. In addition, all control variables retain their signs and signicance.
In both Tables, the Sargan and Anderson tests do not indicate any problems regarding
the choice and the relevance of our instruments. We therefore conclude that the extent of
endogeneity bias is very limited in our sample and our ndings are robust to an instrumental
variables technique.
6.2 An alternative denition for rm failure
Thus far our denition of failed rms is related to the status of the rms as reported in
Thomson Financial Primark and Zephyr. However, to ensure that our results are not driven
from the way that we dene failed rms, we re-dene our dependent variable by focusing
on whether rms drop out of the sample. Specically, the disappearance of a previous
identication number means that this rm has exited the sample and therefore is considered
as failed.14 To avoid any measurement error in our calculations, we also use Zephyr to
identify and drop rms that exited the sample due to takeovers. We re-estimate our model
with the new denition of failure and report results in Table 6. Column 1 refers to the
baseline where we explore the interaction between the Asian crisis and nancial indicators,
while columns 2 to 6 refer to the model which distinguishes across the ve economies included
in our sample. Once again, our results should be compared with those reported in Tables 2
and 3. We continue to observe that rm-specic nancial indicators are more important in
explaining the incidence of failures during the crisis compared to other times. In addition,
when considering these eects across economies with dierent levels of equity development
our main results remain unchanged. In particular, the impact of nancial indicators is more
important in economies with less developed stock exchanges. In sum, we conclude that our
results are robust to modifying the denition of rm failure.
14The opposite is true when a new identication number appears which implies that a new rm has entered
the sample.
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7 Conclusion
Empirical investigation of business failures has considered the eects of macroeconomic con-
ditions and nancial healthiness in isolation. Even few papers have looked at the emerging
Asian economies. In this paper we examine the indirect eect of the Asian crisis on rm
survival since rms with varying levels of protability, debt and collateral might respond
to the crisis dierently. Our results based on rm-level data of ve Asian economies - In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand - over the period 1995{2007 suggest that
the sensitivity of survival to nancial indicators is signicantly higher during the Asian crisis
compared to tranquil periods. Therefore, the Asian crisis had an impact through the balance
sheet on rms' hazard of failure, and could have operated alongside the bank and commer-
cial paper channels with an inuence over real variables. In addition, when we estimate our
results across the ve countries included in our paper, we nd that the eect of nancial
indicators is quantitatively and qualitatively more important in economies with less devel-
oped stock exchanges (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). We show that rms operating in
bank-based economies, which are likely to suer from a credit cut during the crisis, might
have to exhibit good nancial health to continue their operations.
The present study has implications for policy makers both in Asian and western economies,
particularly during the current economic climate. We conclude that rms with bad nancial
health that suer a shortage of credit during recessions should have access to cheap credit to
improve their survival prospects. Therefore, one way for policymakers to mitigate the eect
of nancial crises is to make nance cheaper and more easily available.
Finally, out study has institutional implications. The development of diversied nancial
systems in which well developed stock and bond markets would complement their banking
systems should become a priority in the national governments' agenda. This will help to
facilitate the development of a balanced economy and to create appropriate conditions that
will improve rms' performance and survival prospects.
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Figure 1: Comparing our data with the World Bank database
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Figure 2: Number of failing rms by year
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Figure 3: Baseline hazards
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Table 1: Summary statistics
All rms Fail=1 Fail=0 Di. Crisis=1 Crisis=0 Di.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fail 0.129 1.00 0.00 - 0.220 0.114 0.000
(0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.31)
Leverage 0.562 0.635 0.551 0.000 0.697 0.540 0.000
(0.53) (0.59) (0.52) (0.60) (0.51)
Profitability 7.603 -1.025 8.899 0.000 1.528 8.598 0.000
(29.05) (31.40) (28.46) (31.35) (28.54)
Collateral 0.723 0.638 0.735 0.000 0.721 0.730 0.126
(0.30) (0.37) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31)
Size 14.548 14.292 14.586 0.000 14.332 14.583 0.000
(3.55) (3.34) (3.57) (3.61) (3.53)
Age 14.196 13.447 14.310 0.000 14.584 14.134 0.000
(4.97) (5.01) (4.95) (4.84) (4.99)
Observations 25,718 3,383 22,335 3,574 22,144
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The p-value of a test of the equality
of means is reported. Fail is a dummy that equals 1 if the rm fails, and 0 otherwise. Crisis is a dummy representing the
Asian crisis and takes the value 1 in years 1997-98, and 0 otherwise. Leverage is measured as the rm's total debt to assets
ratio. Profitability is the ratio of the rm's prots before interest and tax to its total assets. Collateral is dened as the ratio
of the rm's tangible assets over its total assets. Size is denoted by the log of real assets. Age measures the number of years a
rm has been listed on the stock exchange. The time period is 1995-2007. Variables are measured in thousands of US dollars.
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Table 2: Survival and the Asian crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage  Crisis 1.329*** 1.627***
(4.58) (3.81)
Leverage  (1  Crisis) 1.085 1.212***
(0.70) (3.94)
Profitability  Crisis 0.988*** 0.990***
(-5.77) (-5.02)
Profitability  (1  Crisis) 0.996** 0.996***
(-2.38) (-2.59)
Collateral  Crisis 0.232*** 0.182***
(-6.72) (-6.22)
Collateral  (1  Crisis) 0.648*** 0.646***
(-3.58) (-3.43)
Size 0.970 0.920 0.912 0.883
(-0.31) (-0.81) (-0.99) (-1.23)
Size2 1.004 1.006 1.006* 1.007*
(1.26) (1.64) (1.77) (1.93)
Age 0.951*** 0.954*** 0.955*** 0.954***
(-6.93) (-6.51) (-6.38) (-6.45)
Exchange 1.063*** 1.066*** 1.064*** 1.068***
(17.12) (17.45) (15.88) (17.66)
MES 1.467 1.380 1.475 1.437
(0.88) (0.74) (0.89) (0.84)
Observations 21700 21659 21700 21659
Log   likelihood -4642 -4616 -4631 -4591
F-test of equality
Leverage 0.081 0.054
Profitability 0.005 0.021
Collateral 0.000 0.000
Notes: Cox regression results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and zero otherwise.
Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and
industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 3: Survival and the Asian crisis with shared frailty models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage  Crisis 1.321*** 1.624***
(3.87) (4.95)
Leverage  (1  Crisis) 1.086 1.287***
(0.96) (3.35)
Profitability  Crisis 0.988*** 0.990***
(-5.30) (-4.03)
Profitability  (1  Crisis) 0.996** 0.996**
(-2.22) (-2.27)
Collateral  Crisis 0.227*** 0.177***
(-5.75) (-5.59)
Collateral  (1  Crisis) 0.630*** 0.627***
(-3.36) (-3.28)
Size 0.976 0.925 0.916 0.886
(-0.23) (-0.69) (-0.84) (-1.09)
Size2 1.004 1.006 1.006 1.007*
(1.12) (1.49) (1.58) (1.75)
Age 0.950*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 0.953***
(-6.34) (-5.89) (-5.79) (-5.82)
Exchange 1.063*** 1.066*** 1.064*** 1.068***
(10.14) (10.52) (10.19) (10.59)
MES 0.752* 0.776 0.839 0.844
(-1.70) (-1.61) (-1.14) (-1.11)
Observations 21700 21659 21700 21659
Log   likelihood -4654 -4627 -4642 -4602
F-test of equality
Leverage 0.076 0.051
Profitability 0.009 0.052
Collateral 0.000 0.000
Notes: Cox regression results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and zero otherwise.
Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and
industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 4: Likelihood ratio test
Observations Log likelihood Log likelihood Degrees of freedom Likelihood ratio
(null) (model) chi2(4)
A 22329 -4830.943 -4612.844 14
B 22329 -3968.702 -3779.129 18
A and B 1667.43
Prob > chi2 0.000
Notes:
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Table 5: Survival and nancial sector development
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leverage  Crisis 0.823** 0.820*** 0.736*** -0.677 1.072**
(2.40) (5.07) (3.39) (-0.79) (1.96)
Leverage  (1  Crisis) 0.136* 0.640*** 0.336** -0.174 0.147
(1.68) (4.17) (2.10) (-0.90) (1.22)
Profitability  Crisis -0.009*** -0.007 -0.022*** -0.003 -0.015***
(-3.20) (-1.27) (-3.92) (-1.26) (-3.26)
Profitability  (1  Crisis) -0.001 -0.006** -0.006 -0.002 -0.005*
(-0.69) (-2.04) (-1.43) (-0.95) (-1.95)
Collateral  Crisis -1.441*** -0.283 -1.082** -0.660 -1.099***
(-3.02) (-0.53) (-2.45) (-1.27) (-4.26 )
Collateral  (1  Crisis) -0.68 -0.808* -0.271 -0.814*** -0.396
(-0.26) (-1.93) (-1.19) (-3.16) (-1.27)
Size 0.667 -0.592 0.019 1.049*** 0.898*
(1.59) (-0.58) (0.05) (2.63) (1.84)
Size2 -0.027* 0.023 0.000 -0.040** -0.030*
(-1.66) (0.84) (0.01) (-2.48) (-1.90)
Age -0.268*** 0.001 -0.025* -0.006 -0.117***
(-10.92) (0.06) (-1.71) (-0.40) (-8.93)
GDP -0.721*** -0.109*** -0.272*** -0.091*** -0.181***
(-3.67) (-4.68) (-2.92) (-4.12) (-4.25)
MES 0.985*** 1.802 -0.947 0.475 0.541
(6.21) (1.51) (-0.81) (0.54) (0.72)
Observations 2,100 6,117 5,600 4,296 3,546
Log   likelihood -342.7 -749.0 -1233 -682.4 -1035
F  test of equality
Leverage 0.001 0.280 0.071 0.561 0.026
Profitability 0.040 0.879 0.024 0.747 0.054
Collateral 0.010 0.241 0.088 0.745 0.080
Notes: Cox regression results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and zero otherwise.
Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country
dummies and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 6: Robustness: IV probit, baseline model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage  Crisis 0.157*** -0.530***
(3.23) (-3.14)
Leverage  (1  Crisis) 0.272*** 0.245***
(8.05) (5.34)
Profitability  Crisis -0.022*** -0.026***
(-4.86) (-5.05)
Profitability  (1  Crisis) -0.010*** -0.008***
(-8.45) (-6.21)
Collateral  Crisis -0.454*** 0.178
(-3.50) (1.35)
Collateral  (1  Crisis) 0.191 -0.233***
(1.43) (-4.09)
Size 0.261*** 0.197*** 0.284*** 0.197***
(6.22) (4.64) (5.81) (4.65)
Size2 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(-4.37) (-3.23) (-4.35) (-3.25)
Age -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.037***
(-14.84) (-13.79) (-12.50) (-13.64)
Exchange 0.006 -0.002 -0.075 -0.001
(0.11) (-0.04) (-0.98) (-0.02)
MES -0.210* -0.164 -0.305** -0.137
(-1.65) (-1.28) (-2.11) (-1.07)
Observations 20,553 20,514 17,178 20,514
F-test of equality
Leverage 0.000 0.003
Profitability 0.015 0.721
Collateral 0.002 0.085
P-values of
test statistics
Wald Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan Test 0.215 0.432 0.325 0.302
Anderson test 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.005
Notes: IV Probit regression results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and
zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The following countries are included in the regressions:
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country
dummies and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 7: Robustness: IV probit, nancial sector development
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leverage  Crisis 0.289 0.047 0.557*** -0.138 -0.113
(1.13) (0.07) (3.18) (-0.30) (-0.51)
Leverage  (1  Crisis) 0.129** -0.189 0.174** -0.172 -0.572***
(2.02) (-0.56) (2.42) (-0.65) (-4.06)
Profitability  Crisis -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.021 -0.007*
(-0.69) (-0.21) (-1.11) (-1.35) (-1.73)
Profitability  (1  Crisis) -0.010* -0.019** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.024***
(-1.96) (-2.42) (-4.87) (-0.38) (-3.73)
Collateral  Crisis -0.280 1.986 -0.812** -0.915** -0.812**
(-0.40) (1.16) (-2.02) (-2.41) (-2.13)
Collateral  (1  Crisis) 0.234 0.348 -0.262** -0.311 -0.861***
(0.97) (1.31) (-2.40) (-1.13) (-3.79)
Size -0.835*** -0.771 0.700*** 1.054*** 1.111***
(-3.73) (-1.59) (4.91) (5.72) (3.42)
Size2 0.026*** 0.020 -0.023*** -0.042*** -0.033***
(4.03) (1.59) (-4.19) (-5.57) (-3.18)
Age -0.264*** 0.002 -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.197***
(-14.50) (0.20) (-5.53) (-2.78) (-17.89)
Exchange 0.658 0.359 -0.194*** -0.296 -0.167**
(1.19) (1.51) (-3.23) (-1.24) (-2.55)
MES 0.017 -0.007 -0.063** 0.384 -0.183
(0.08) (-0.02) (-1.97) (0.97) (-0.68)
Observations 1,758 4,400 4,441 3,416 3,050
F-test of equality
Leverage 0.022 0.8351 0.055 0.351 0.004
Profitability 0.011 0.256 0.002 0.947 0.039
Collateral 0.005 0.759 0.036 0.144 0.029
P-values of
test statistics
Wald Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan Test 0.115 0.256 0.301 0.289 241
Anderson test 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.003
Notes: IV Probit regression results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and zero
otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at
1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 8: Robustness: an alternative denition of failure
Baseline Model Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leverage  Crisis 0.495** 0.827*** 0.710** 0.761*** -0.568 0.716***
(4.89) (5.44) (2.24) (5.65) (-0.76) (4.87)
Leverage  (1  Crisis) 0.262*** 0.419* 0.659*** 0.332* 0.675** 0.210*
(3.01) (1.90) (3.72) (1.77) (2.05) (1.82)
Profitability  Crisis -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.007 -0.016*** -0.005 -0.019***
(-7.29) (-4.76) (-1.25) (-5.32) (-0.92) (-4.82)
Profitability  (1  Crisis) -0.010*** -0.006* -0.013* -0.006* 0.003 -0.007*
(-6.59) (-1.67) (-1.75) (-1.70) (0.79) (-1.68)
Collateral  Crisis -0.663*** -0.831*** 1.084 -0.875*** -0.388 -1.151***
(-4.48) (-4.25) (1.39) (-5.75) (-0.71) (3.85)
Collateral  (1  Crisis) -0.383 -0.356 -0.347 -0.410 -0.460 -0.365
(-1.46) (-1.57) (-0.63) (-1.63) (-1.54) (-1.53)
Size 0.141 0.287 1.793* 0.072 1.187*** 1.285***
(1.09) (1.13) (1.74) (0.18) (2.73) (2.65)
Size2 -0.001 -0.008 -0.039 0.002 -0.041** -0.040**
(-0.15) (-0.89) (-1.46) (0.12) (-2.46) (-2.57)
Age -0.094*** -0.145*** 0.005 -0.062*** -0.026* -0.221***
(-9.23) (-8.65) (0.21) (-3.12) (-1.66) (-11.44)
GDP 0.003 -0.009 0.049 0.010 -0.024 -0.049***
(0.22) (-0.22) (1.47) (0.29) (-1.07) (-2.65)
MES 0.451 0.055 1.934* 0.672 0.752 0.926
(0.95) (0.06) (1.84) (0.88) (0.80) (0.98)
Observations 24,242 2,372 6,448 6,745 4,786 3,891
Log   likelihood -3647 127.34 162.66 3487.6 4784.3 419.51
F-test of equality
Leverageit 0.071 0.007 0.884 0.084 0.893 0.006
Profitabilityit 0.088 0.051 0.325 0.012 0.234 0.035
Collateralit 0.299 0.093 0.106 0.088 0.894 0.04
Notes: Cox regression results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm drops out of the
data, and zero otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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